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The author is Director of Regional Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and co-editor of the newly published book “Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean: Geopolitical, Security and Energy Dynamics”
If ever there was a time to use superlatives about Middle Eastern affairs, it is 2024. The cascade of events that began in October 2023 was nothing short of dizzying. If the momentous mix of tragic, spectacular and strategic episodes takes some time to settle down, what has already happened will undoubtedly have a lasting impact.
The diverse and already fragile Levantine societies are subject to drastic historical changes. Given local reluctance and global fatigue, they are unlikely to find much outside help. The reorganization of the region is accompanied by great violence and new competition.
Palestinians are suffering unprecedented suffering at the hands of the Israeli military in Gaza. Hamas’s failed bloody bet and its partners’ inability to come to the rescue are a reminder that the only path to Palestinian statehood is through internationalization and a negotiated outcome. The coalition for a two-state solution organized by Saudi Arabia, other Arab states and European nations has emerged as the most likely vehicle for this. The Palestinians would have to be convinced that this was more than just a symbolic diplomatic dance, but they would also have to show that they were responsible for the process, which only a long-awaited reform of the Palestinian Authority would bring about. However, such efforts remain vulnerable to Israeli intransigence and the potential wrath of Donald Trump.
In parallel, Israeli society has gone from extreme trauma to military triumph in just over a year. This has reinforced the belief that Israel can only count on its military might and that expansionism in Gaza, the occupied West Bank and now southern Syria is not only justified but necessary. The unconditional support that Israel receives from the United States and several European states has enabled it to reject the need for a just peace that provides security for all.
But this security-only mindset has perverse consequences. It is costly, it increases dependence on the United States, and it alienates existing and potential partners in the neighborhood who fear that Israel will expand the conflict by attacking Iran’s leadership and nuclear facilities. The reputational damage of the Gaza war is immense and legal liabilities are looming. The authority of Benjamin Netanyahu and his radical followers appears to be secure as internal disagreements over the nature of the Israeli state grow.
For the Lebanese, an opposite dynamic is at play. An overbearing Hezbollah faces the collapse of its military strategy, ideological narrative, and overall credibility. Revitalizing their ethos of resistance is a major challenge given the need to lick their deep wounds, the sudden loss of Syria and the dire situation of their electorate. Many Lebanese who sense an opportunity face two opposing forces: they understand that they will not have any further chances to reform their state, but they also recognize the danger of provoking a wounded Hezbollah that could spark domestic conflict.
Above all, Syrians are experiencing their first taste of freedom after decades of oppression. The rot of the Assad regime allowed it to collapse quickly without feared scenes of mass sectarian violence. Instead, the new Islamist government in Damascus has shown restraint and a certain wisdom. However, securing peace requires great magnanimity and commitment to inclusive governance, regardless of internal and external disruptors.
At least the Syrians can be happy that they have exposed the shortcomings of realpolitik. It is a great irony that a decade ago most Arab and Western states wanted the overthrow of the Assad regime, but Syrians were divided. In early December, many Arab and Western states wanted Assad to stay, but Syrians largely agreed to push through internal changes. They will now need foreign goodwill. To achieve Arab-Kurdish reconciliation, Turkish moderation and U.S. diplomacy will be crucial. To reassure the Alawite community, Russian mediation could be helpful. The Gulf states could help neutralize Iranian influence.
Iran is the undeniable loser in all this. It joined forces with militias to expand its influence in fractured states and divided societies. She expected these groups to advance her interests, but instead became embroiled in the wars they instigated. Turkey took advantage and outwitted Tehran in Syria, the region’s key geopolitical theater.
Many people in Western capitals will take comfort in the fact that these historic changes have so far been surprisingly contained. No massive migration crisis, no prolonged war between states, no major terrorist attack outside the region, no lasting impact on oil prices, no resulting disruption to global trade. This is the complacency that paves the way for unwelcome surprises.
