A year after the invasion began, Britain questioned US “control” over its Iraq tactics

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The British government questioned US control over its military operations in Iraq 13 months after the war began, newly released documents show, highlighting the Blair government’s frustration with its key ally.

The documents published by the Cabinet Office on Tuesday included internal briefings for then-Prime Minister Tony Blair that raised concerns about whether the U.S. had a handle on its invasion tactics.

“The Prime Minister may wish to question Bush about whether there is proper political control over military operations,” the documents say.

The briefings, held ahead of a meeting with President George W. Bush on April 16, 2004, also revealed that Britain believed that “too many military officers were talking tough to a US audience.”

The revelations highlight the British government’s growing frustration with the US following the start of the first Battle of Fallujah on April 4, which led to Iraqi insurgents’ victory.

Blair’s decision to join the US-led invasion of Iraq dented his approval ratings and led to growing pressure within the party for him to resign. In 2007, Blair resigned as Labor leader after ten years as prime minister.

A separate document from the British Embassy in Washington, sent to Number 10 after the first week of the battle, revealed that then US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage had told the British ambassador that Bush had “kicked some ass” in Fallujah. want .

But “faced with the reality” that his actions could topple the Iraqi government, Bush was forced to back down, it said.

The paper said Armitage believed Bush “still believes he is on some God’s mission in Iraq” and expressed his view that the US was “gradually losing on the battlefield” and there was “no coherent strategy for the operations.

He then called on the British to argue with Bush that the United Nations must play an important role in establishing a political process in the country.

Before his meeting with Bush, Blair was informed by officials that Fallujah “did not show U.S. planning at its best,” that American tactics were “clumsy,” and that their “public statements had raised the temperature,” making the situation worse.

The British hoped to reach a private agreement at the meeting that the US approach “needs to be more measured” as it “loses political capital” for both governments.

The documents also show that British officials believed that the management of the US coalition had “never been good” since the start of the war.

The newspapers said that the United States was convinced that the governments of Poland, Spain and Ukraine had “let us down.” The British also expressed their own frustration with Ukraine over its perceived lack of support for the war effort.

The “Coalition of the Willing” was formed in early 2003 before the decision to invade Iraq on March 20. At its peak it covered 49 countries.

The documents came ahead of the planned June 30 political transition in which Iraq’s interim government took control of the country from the established ruling council.

The conflict finally ended in 2011 after a protracted insurgency by militant groups following the overthrow of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in 2003.

The Cabinet Office and Armitage declined to comment.