A New York Times investigation has found that in the weeks following Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack, Israel significantly undermined its security system to facilitate an attack on Gaza and used flawed methods to find targets and assess the risk to civilians.
The Israeli military acknowledged changes to its rules of engagement but said they were made in the context of an unprecedented military threat and always adhered to the laws of war.
Here are some of the key findings from the research.
Increased civilian damage threshold per preemptive strike
In previous conflicts with Hamas, Israeli officers were typically only allowed to endanger fewer than 10 civilians in an attack. In many cases the limit was five or even zero.
At the start of this war, the Israeli military increased this threshold to 20, before lowering it in certain contexts a month later. Attacks that could harm more than 100 civilians would also be permitted in individual cases.
Expanded list of destinations
Israel has significantly increased the number of military targets it attempted to proactively attack. Officers could now track not only the smaller circle of senior Hamas commanders, weapons depots and rocket launchers that had been the focus of previous campaigns, but also thousands of low-ranking fighters and those indirectly involved in military affairs.
Limits on how many civilians could be put at risk on a daily basis have been lifted
The military leadership briefly ordered that its forces could cumulatively risk killing up to 500 civilians per day in pre-planned attacks. Two days later, even that restriction was lifted, allowing officials to stage as many strikes as they deemed lawful.
Hit too quickly to properly check all targets
The pace of bombing was one of the most intense in 21st century warfare, making it significantly more difficult to properly check targets, officials said. Israel dropped or fired nearly 30,000 munitions into Gaza in the first seven weeks, at least 30 times more than the US-led coalition fired in the first seven weeks of its bombing campaign against ISIS.
Uses a simplified risk assessment
Israel often used a simplified statistical model to assess the risk of civilian harm: it regularly estimated the number of civilians in a building where a target was believed to be hiding, using a formula based largely on the level of cell phone use in the surrounding area Neighborhood based.
Dropped big, inaccurate bombs
In previous wars, the Luftwaffe often used a “roof knock,” a smaller munition, to give civilians some time to flee an impending attack. From day one of this war, Israel significantly reduced the use of rooftop attacks. The military also sometimes used less precise “dumb bombs” as well as 2,000-pound bombs.
Uses AI to suggest goals
Israel used an artificial intelligence system on a large scale for the first time. It helped officials analyze and approve targets exponentially faster, increasing the number of targets officials could propose each day.
Delayed strikes
Hours often passed between an officer checking a target and the Luftwaffe attacking the target. This meant that attacks were often based on outdated information.
