What does China’s “magic weapon” of influence do?
According to its founding leader Mao Zedong and current President Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China has a “magic weapon.”
It’s called the United Front Work Department – and it’s causing as much concern in the West as Beijing’s growing military arsenal.
Yang Tengbo, a well-known businessman linked to Prince Andrewis the latest foreign Chinese citizen to be investigated and sanctioned for his ties to the UFWD.
The department’s existence is no secret. A decades-old and well-documented branch of the Chinese Communist Party, it has been mired in controversy before. Investigators from the United States to Australia have cited the UFWD in several espionage cases, often accusing Beijing of using it for foreign interference.
Beijing has rejected all allegations of espionage, calling them ridiculous.
So what is the UFWD and what does it do?
“Control China’s Embassy”
The united front – originally a broad communist alliance – was once hailed by Mao as the key to the Communist Party’s victory in the decades-long Chinese civil war.
After the war ended in 1949 and the party came to power in China, the activities of the united front took a back seat to other priorities. But in the last decade under Xi, the United Front has experienced something of a renaissance.
Xi’s version of the united front is broadly consistent with previous incarnations: “building the broadest possible coalition with all relevant social forces,” said Mareike Ohlberg, senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund.
At first glance, the UFWD is no shadow – it even has a website and reports on many of its activities. But the scope of his work – and its reach – is less clear.
While much of this work is done domestically, Dr. Ohlberg, “overseas Chinese are a key target defined for the work of the United Front.”
Today, the UFWD seeks to influence public discussions on sensitive issues ranging from Taiwan – which China claims as its territory – to the oppression of ethnic minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang.
There are also attempts to shape narratives about China in foreign media, target Chinese government critics abroad and co-opt influential foreign Chinese figures.
“The work of the United Front may involve espionage, but it is broader than espionage,” Audrye Wong, assistant professor of politics at the University of Southern California, told the BBC.
“Beyond the act of obtaining covert information from a foreign government, the United Front’s activities focus on the broader mobilization of overseas Chinese,” she said, adding that China is “unique in the scale and scope” of such influence activities.
China has always had the ambition to gain such influence, but its rise in recent decades has given Beijing the opportunity to exercise it.
Since becoming president in 2012, Xi has been particularly proactive in crafting China’s message to the worldencouraging confrontation “Wolf Warrior” approach to diplomacy and called on his country’s diaspora to “tell China’s story well.”
The UFWD operates through various overseas Chinese community organizations that have vigorously defended the Communist Party outside its borders. They have censored anti-CCP artwork and protested against the activities of the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama. The UFWD has also been linked to threats against members of persecuted minorities abroad, such as Tibetans and Uyghurs.
However, much of the UFWD’s work overlaps with that of other party agencies and operates under what observers call “plausible deniability.”
It is this ambiguity that creates so much distrust and concern about the UFWD.
When Yang appealed his ban from leaving the United Kingdom over espionage allegations, an immigration court ruled that he had downplayed his ties to the UFWD. British officials allege he exploited his relationships with influential British figures to encourage Chinese state interference.
However, Yang maintains that he did nothing illegal and that the espionage allegations are “completely untrue.”
Cases like Yang’s are becoming more and more common. In 2022, British-Chinese lawyer Christine Lee was accused by MI5 of acting through the UFWD to cultivate relationships with influential people in the United Kingdom. The following year, Liang Litang, a U.S. citizen who ran a Chinese restaurant in Boston, was indicted for providing his contacts in the UFWD with information about Chinese dissidents in the area.
And in September, Linda Sun, a former aide in the New York governor’s office, was accused of using her position to serve the interests of the Chinese government – and receiving benefits, including travel, in return. According to Chinese state media reports, she met a senior UFWD official in 2017 who told her she should be “an ambassador of Sino-American friendship.”
It is not uncommon for prominent and successful Chinese people to be associated with the party, whose approval they often need, especially in the business world.
But where is the line between influence peddling and espionage?
“The line between influence and espionage is blurred” when it comes to Beijing’s operations, said Ho-fung Hung, a politics professor at Johns Hopkins University.
This ambiguity has worsened after China passed a law in 2017 requiring Chinese nationals and companies to cooperate in intelligence investigations, including sharing information with the Chinese government – a move that Dr. Hung “effectively turns everyone into potential spies.”
The Ministry of State Security has released dramatic propaganda videos warning the public that foreign spies are everywhere and that “they are cunning and deceitful.”
Some students who were sent abroad on special trips were ordered by their universities to limit contact with foreigners and were asked to provide a report on their activities upon their return.
And yet Xi is interested in making China known to the world. That’s why he has tasked a trusted arm of the party with showing strength abroad.
And that becomes a challenge for Western powers: How do they balance doing business with the world’s second-largest economy with serious security concerns?
Wrestling with the long arm of Beijing
Real fears about China’s influence abroad lead to more hawkish sentiment in the West and often create a dilemma for governments.
Some, like Australia, have tried to protect themselves against foreign interference with new laws criminalize those deemed to be interfering in domestic affairs. In 2020, the US imposed visa restrictions on people deemed to be active in UFWD activities.
An angry Beijing warned that such laws – and associated prosecutions – were hampering bilateral relations.
“The so-called allegations of Chinese espionage are completely absurd,” a State Department spokesman told reporters on Tuesday in response to a question about Yang. “The development of China-UK relations serves the common interests of both countries.”
Some experts say China’s long arm of the united front is actually worrisome.
“Western governments must now be less naive about the work of China’s united front and view it as a serious threat not only to national security, but also to the safety and freedom of many ethnic Chinese citizens,” says Dr. Hung.
However, he adds: “Governments must also be vigilant against anti-Chinese racism.” and work hard to build trust and cooperation with ethnic Chinese communities to jointly counter the threat.”
Last December, Di Sanh Duong, a Vietnamese-born ethnic Chinese community leader in Australia, was convicted of plotting foreign interference for attempting to align himself with an Australian minister. Prosecutors argued that he was an “ideal target” for the UFWD because he ran for office in the 1990s and boasted of ties to Chinese officials.
Duong’s trial revolved around what he meant when he said involving the minister in a charity event would be beneficial to “us Chinese” – did he mean the Chinese community in Australia or mainland China?
Ultimately, Duong’s conviction – and a prison sentence – raised serious concerns that such sweeping anti-espionage laws and prosecutions could easily grow to scale Weapons to target ethnic Chinese.
“It is important to remember that not every ethnic Chinese is a supporter of the Chinese Communist Party. And not everyone involved in these diaspora organizations is driven by fervent loyalty to China,” says Dr. Wong.
“An overly aggressive policy based on racial profiling will only legitimize the Chinese government’s propaganda that ethnic Chinese are not welcome and end up pushing diaspora communities even further into Beijing’s arms.”